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public or damage or theft of the owner's property is likely to occur
while a warrant is being procured.
Where impoundment is predicated on public protection, the second
branch of the proposed test would usually be met. If a danger to the
public exists, it is likely to be immediate. 60 But where impoundment is
undertaken to protect the owner, delaying impoundment until a war-
rant is obtained will often be practicable. Where an automobile is
legally parked in a business district during daylight hours, for in-
stance, it may well be possible to obtain a warrant before the threat to
the owner's property becomes significant.
If the above tests had been applied in 1972 Porsche, the court could
have reached its result on either of two grounds. First, it could have
reasoned that impoundment was unnecessary per se. Since the car was
legally parked in a residential neighborhood, the court could have con-
cluded the police had no basis for believing the car posed a threat to
the public or was likely to attract thieves or vandals. Secondly, the
court could have concluded that under the circumstances theft or
damage was likely to occur only if the car were left in the neighbor-
hood for an extended period. Therefore, the court could have reasoned,
there was no exigency sufficient to dispense with the warrant require-
ment.
The 1972 Porsche court, of course, did not go so far. At most, the
ambiguous opinion indicates that impoundment is a seizure subject to
fourth amendment requirements, and that a bare claim of police self-
protection does not create an exception to those requirements. But if
Florida courts pursue the rationale of McCormick in subsequent cases,
they may succeed in making impoundment and inventory procedures
consistent with other search and seizure law.
MICHAEL P. MABILE
Criminal Law-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
FLORIDA'S KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE STATUTE AND THE EXCLUSIONARY
RuLE.-State v. Roman, 309 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
Two armed plainclothes police officers accompanied by an unarmed
police cadet went to a college dormitory to execute search warrants
and capiases on two students. Unable to find the students, the officers
enlisted the aid of defendant Mark Roman. The officers did not inform
60. See, e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Cardenas v. Pitchess, 506 F.2d
1224 (9th Cir. 1974). In each case the danger to the public was that a weapon contained
in the car might fall into the wrong hands if not quickly recovered by police officers.
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the defendant that they were police officers. They simply stated they
wished to find the two students to "buy some dope." The defendant,
a student in the same dormitory, indicated that he had some drugs
for sale and invited the officers into his room. He then produced a
quantity of marijuana from a drawer and negotiated a price with
the officers.
Officer Beckstrom left the room ostensibly to get the money,
leaving behind the other officer, the police cadet, and the marijuana.
A few moments later Beckstrom and two other officers, guns drawn,
entered the defendant's room. Beckstrom, who had reentered the room
without knocking or announcing his authority, arrested the defendant
and seized the marijuana that had been the subject of the proposed
sale. The officers handcuffed the defendant, and, holding him at gun-
point, proceeded to search the desk and dresser. They discovered
further contraband. The defendant was told that if he cooperated by
revealing the location of more marijuana, he would not be charged
further. He did so and additional marijuana was seized.'
The District Court of Appeal for the Fourth District affirmed
a lower court order suppressing all of the marijuana seized as a result
of the defendant's arrest. Rejecting the state's contentions that the
unannounced reentry of the arresting officer fell within exceptions to
Florida's statutory knock and announce requirements,2 the court held
the reentry illegal. Therefore, under the exclusionary rule, all
evidence seized as a result of the illegal entry and arrest was, in the
court's opinion, properly excluded.
Knock and announce statutes, which require a police officer to
announce his authority and purpose prior to entrance for search or
arrest, have been enacted in most states and at the federal level.3 These
1. State v. Roman, 309 So. 2d 12, 13-14 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
2. FLA. STAT. § 901.19(1) (1973) provides:
If a peace officer fails to gain admittance after he has announced his authority
and purpose in order to make an arrest either by a warrant or when authorized
to make an arrest for a felony without a warrant, he may use all necessary and
reasonable force to enter any building or property where the person to be arrested
is or is reasonably believed to be.
3. See Ebner & Sonnenreich, No-Knock and Nonsense, An Alleged Constitutional
Problem, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 626, 654-59 (1970), for a list of state knock and announce
statutes. See also Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v.
United States and Ker v. California, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 499 (1964).
The federal knock and announce statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1970), provides:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house,
or any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if,
after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when
necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.
The federal statute is the basis for many state knock and announce statutes. Although
§ 3109 expressly deals with the entry of federal officers pursuant to a search warrant,
19751
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statutes represent a codification of early common law principles re-
garding the protection of individual privacy and the preservation of
private property.4 The underlying purpose of these statutes is protec-
the same requirements have been held applicable to an entry or search without a war-
rant: "[T]he validity of the entry [of a federal officer] to execute the arrest without
warrant must be tested by criteria identical with those embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 3109,
which deals with entry to execute a search warrant." Miller v. United States, 357 U.S.
301, 306 (1958). See also Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974).
Generally the statutes require that before an officer is authorized to break into a
home, he must (1) give due notice of his authority; (2) announce his purpose; and
(3) be denied admittance. See Miller v. United States, supra; Whisnant v. State, 303
So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974). Cf. Urquhart v. State, 211 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1968); Koptyra v. State, 172 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965). In
Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1964), the court set forth Florida's announce-
ment criteria: "When an officer is authorized to make an arrest in any building, he
should first approach the entrance to the building. He should then knock on the
door and announce his name and authority, sheriff, . . . policeman or other legal
authority[,] and what his purpose is in being there." Id. at 709.
The failure of an officer to announce his purpose and authority has been excused
by the courts when there is sufficient evidence to justify the officer's belief that com-
pliance would have been a "useless gesture," e.g., where the people inside the dwelling
were already aware of the purpose and authority of the officer. See Miller v. United
States, supra, 357 U.S. at 310 (officer's belief must be "virtually certain"); United States
v. Manning, 448 F.2d 992 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971); United States v.
Squella-Avendano, 447 F.2d 575 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); Wittner
v. United States 406 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1969); Der Garabedian v. United States, 372
F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1966); People v. Maddox, 294 P.2d 6, 9 (Cal.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
858 (1956) (announcement requirements excused when police have "reasonable cause" and
"good faith belief" that compliance would allow felon to escape); Benefield v. State, supra;
State v. Clarke, 242 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
An officer's unannounced entry has been excused when the officer has a reasonable
belief that the destruction of evidence is being attempted. See Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23, 40 (1963); United States v. Mapp, 476 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1973); United States
v. Cisneros, 448 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1971); People v. De Santiago, 453 P.2d 353 (Cal.
1969); People v. Maddox, supra; Earman v. State, 265 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1972); Benefield
v. State, supra; State v. Clarke, supra.
The announcement requirements have also been excused when there is sufficient
evidence to support the officer's belief that persons within are in imminent peril of
bodily harm or the entering officer would be in danger if an announcement were made.
See Miller v. United States, supra, 357 U.S. at 309; United States v. Leon, 487 F.2d 389
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, sub nom. Harrison v. United States, 417 U.S. 933 (1974);
United States v. Garcia Mendez, 437 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1971); People v. Tribble, 484
P.2d 589 (Cal. 1971); Benefield v. State, supra; State v. Bell, 249 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1971).
For a further discussion of the requirements of the federal knock and announce
statute, see Annot., 21 A.L.R. FED. 820 (1974).
4. One of the earliest decisions under English common law requiring announce-
ment before entry was Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603):
In all cases when the King is a party, the sheriff (if the doors be not open) may
break the party's house, either to arrest him, or to do execution of the K[ing]'s
process, if otherwise he cannot enter. But before he breaks it, he ought to signify
the cause of his coming, and to make request to open the doors . ...
[Vol. 3
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tion against potential violence. Implicit in the requirement of an-
nouncement is the recognition of the danger of violent response or
counterresponse by a "fearful householder" unaware of the officer's
authority or purpose.5 While there is no legal right to resist a lawful
arrest, courts have recognized the right of a home owner under
the common law to use force to repel an unannounced intruder.6
Force used against the arresting officer has been considered excusable
when the officer's conduct was not in conformity with standards set
by statute or recognized at common law.7
The requirement of announcement prior to entry also partially
ensures the right to privacy generally considered protected by the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution8 and section 12
of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution.9 Courts are
particularly solicitous of the right to privacy when the premises en-
tered or searched is a dwelling. In such instances, the courts, recogniz-
Although Semayne's Case involved the execution of a civil writ, the reasoning of the
court was subsequently applied to the execution of a criminal warrant. The case
stands for the proposition that peace officers should announce their presence before
forcibly entering a building. Note, Announcement in Police Entries 80 YALE L.J. 139,
143 n.17 (1970). Announcement came to include a statement of identity and purpose
by the executing officer. Case of Richard Curtis, 168 Eng. Rep. 67 (Cr. Cas. 1757).
See also Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968); Miller v. United States, 357
U.S. 301 (1958); United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 9 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974) (announcement rule reduces the potential for violence
to both officers and occupants of the house to which the entry is sought, guards against
the needless destruction of private property, and symbolizes respect for individual
privacy).
5. See Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139, 153-54 (1970), for
a discussion of the purpose of the announcement statute and the right to resist an
unlawful arrest. See also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459 (1948) (Jackson, J.,
concurring); Annot., 32 A.L.R. 1541 (1924); Annot., 25 A.L.R. 508 (1923).
6. Note, supra note 5, at 153.
7. Id. See also Annot., 32 A.L.R. 1541 (1924); Annot., 25 A.L.R. 508 (1923).
8. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
9. FLA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 12 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable
interception of private communications by any means, shall not be violated. No
warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit,
particularly describing the place or places to be searched, the person or per-
sons, thing or things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the
nature of evidence to be obtained. Articles or information obtained in violation
of this right shall not be admissible in evidence.
Although the final sentence of § 12 was not added until 1968, Florida courts have
previously read it into the state constitution. See note 15 infra.
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ing the common law belief that a man has a right to be secure in his
home, have required stricter compliance with the announcement
standard than when, for example, a car is searched. 10 The courts,
however, have regarded fourth amendment rights as personal rights
that cannot be vicariously claimed. Thus application of the exclu-
sionary rule to suppress evidence obtained in a search or entry viola-
tive of fourth amendment guarantees can only be urged by one who
is in lawful possession of the premises or who has a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy."
The exclusionary rule developed as a means of effectuating fourth
amendment requirements. Essentially a remedy, the rule was designed
"to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty." 12 By excluding
evidence seized in violation of constitutional rights, the courts hoped
to discourage illegal entries and searches.' In addition, the courts
recognized a certain impropriety in simultaneously condemning con-
10. See, e.g., Moreno v. State, 277 So. 2d 81, 83 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (an-
nouncement requirement should be strictly observed where building is a person's
home); Koptyra v. State, 172 So. 2d 628, 631 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (announce-
ment requirement deeply rooted in our history and should not be given grudging
application).
11. See Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347 (1967). On the issue of standing, see
Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-72 (1969) ("[S]uppression of the product
of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose
rights were violated .. .not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of
damaging evidence."); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U. S. 364 (1968); Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257 (1960); Chacon v. State, 102 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1957); Russell v. State, 270
So. 2d 462 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Miller v. State, 137 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1962); Comment, Standing To Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure,
34 U. CHi. L. REV. 342 (1967).
12. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961), quoting Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
The exclusionary rule was first imposed upon the federal courts as the method
of enforcing fourth amendment rights in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Prior to 1961, however, state courts were not required to exclude illegally obtained
evidence. Although in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), the Supreme Court
held that the fourth amendment was incorporated into the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment, the exclusionary rule was not considered a constitutional man-
date to effectuate those rights. Wolf required the states to prohibit unreasonable searches
and seizures, but left the means to do so to the states' discretion. Then in Mapp v.
Ohio, supra, the Weeks exclusionary rule was finally applied to the states because
other methods of enforcing fourth amendment guarantees had proved ineffective. The
Court's decision in Mapp did not totally invalidate existing state laws regarding search
or entry provided they did not conflict with fourth amendment rights. See Beck v. Ohio,
379 U.S. 89, 92 (1964), which recognized that the states had the power to develop work-
able rules regarding arrest and seizure to meet the demands of the state.
13. For consideration of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent, see Linkletter v. Walk-
er, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Oaks, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CH. L. REV. 665 (1970); Traynor, Mapp
v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 334. See also Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
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duct and impliedly condoning that conduct by use of the resulting
evidence.14 Florida was one of the earliest supporters of the rule. 5 Its
courts, in implementing the rule, have considered all evidence ob-
tained by an illegal search or entry to be subject to exclusion.' 6 But
the rights protected by the fourth amendment are not absolute; not
all searches or entries are protected. The protection of the fourth
amendment, and therefore of the exclusionary rule as a means of
effectuating that protection, has been limited to instances in which
evidence was obtained by "unreasonable" means."' The issue of un-
reasonableness is, in Florida, determined by the trial court on the
basis of the factual situation presented in each case. It is tested by "the
traditional requirements of our judicial precedents as well as by the
legislative enactments established to implement the requirements of
the Constitution. ' 18
The exclusionary rule has long been attacked. Criticism directed
against application of the rule has been based upon a lack of evidence
of its effectiveness as a deterrent to illegal searches and seizures, as
well as a recognition of the doctrine's anomalous result.' The exclu-
14. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 394 (1914), noted, "To sanction such
proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect if not an open
defiance of the prohibitions of the Constitution, intended for the protection of the
people against such unauthorized action."
For discussion of the normative justification for the exclusionary rule, see Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 470 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting); id. at 483 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting); Oaks, supra note 13; Comment, The Exclusionary Rule in Context, 50
N.C.L. REV. 1049 (1972).
15. Prior to 1968, the Florida Constitution did not specify the exclusionary rule
as the remedy for seizures in violation of constitutional guarantees. Case law, however,
applied the rule in interpreting constitutional rights. See State ex rel. Wilson v. Quigg, 17
So. 2d 697 (Fla. 1944); Kendall v. State, 157 So. 569 (Fla. 1934); Cooper v. State, 143
So. 217 (Fla. 1932); Gildrie v. State, 113 So. 704 (Fla. 1927). The 1968 revision of the
Florida Constitution incorporated the exclusionary rule in a constitutional provision,
FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12. See note 9 supra.
16. E.g., Collins v. State, 65 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1953); Boynton v. State, 64 So. 2d
536 (Fla. 1953); Brown v. State, 62 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1952); Gildrie v. State, 113 So. 704 (Fla.
1927). See FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 12, quoted in note 9 supra, which states that the exclu-
sionary rule is applicable in Florida. See also Williams, Trends of Search and Seizure
in Florida, 16 U. FLA. L. REV. 180 (1963); 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 288 (1955).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV and FLA. CONsT. art. 1, § 12 use the term "unreasonable"
in defining the scope of protection from searches and seizures. See Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); United States v. O'Brien, 174 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1949).
18. Chacon v. State, 102 So. 2d 578, 589 (Fla. 1957). See also Go-Bart Importing
Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931) (no formula exists for the determination
of reasonableness; each case must be decided on facts and circumstances); Rodriguez v.
State, 189 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966), cert. denied, sub non. Suarez v.
Florida, 389 U.S. 848 (1967).
19. See, e.g., Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585,
587 (N.Y. 1926) ("The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered."). For
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sionary rule does nothing to punish directly the offending law enforce-
ment officer, while it may release a guilty defendant. The rule operates
to protect persons- against whom incriminating evidence has been
found, but provides no redress for innocent victims of illegal, but fruit-
less, searches. "[T]he [exclusionary rule] is a manifestation of sterile
indignation, and is essentially negative. It punishes society as a whole
for the transgressions of a poorly trained or badly motivated policeman
but does nothing to get at the heart of the problem. '" 20
The United States Supreme Court seems to be limiting the use
of the exclusionary rule.2 1 While the exclusionary rule cannot be
an empirical study of the operation of the rule, see Oaks, supra note 13. Cf. Amsterdam,
The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 785
(1970); Burns, Mapp v. Ohio: An All-American Mistake, 19 DE PAUL L. REv. 80 (1969);
Little, The Exclusionary Rule of Evidence as a Means of Enforcing Fourth Amendment
Morality on Police, 3 IND. LEGAL F. 375 (1970).
20. Killough v. United States, 315 F.2d 241, 257-58 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (Burger,
J., dissenting).
21. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (witness' testimony against
suspect is admissible at trial when the witness is available for cross-examination, even
though identity of witness was discovered in interrogation of suspect conducted without
full Miranda warnings); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (exclusionary
rule inapplicable to grand jury investigations); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973) (only voluntary consent, not knowledge of right to refuse consent, is re-
quired for a valid consent to search); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (number
of situations in which out-of-court identifications would be suppressed limited); Kastigar
v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) ("use immunity" statute upheld, thereby reducing
the scope of immunity required before one is compelled to give self-incriminating
testimony); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (accused's statements made in
absence of adequate Miranda warnings may be used to impeach).
In Brown v. Illinois, 95 S. Ct. 2254 (1975), the Court noted that the exclusionary
rule serves different purposes when used to effectuate the fourth and fifth amend-
ments. Id. at 2260. In Brown, the defendant had made inculpatory statements following
in illegal arrest, but the statements had been preceded by Miranda warnings. The
Court stated that "exclusion of a confession made without Miranda warnings might
be regarded as necessary to effectuate the Fifth Amendment, but it would not be
sufficient fully to protect the Fourth," since "[t]he exclusionary rule . . . when utilized
to effectuate the Fourth Amendment . . . is directed at all unlawful searches and
seizures, and not merely those that happen to produce incriminating material or testi-
mony as fruits." Id. The Court held that the Miranda warnings, in themselves, were
insufficient to purge the taint of the illegal arrest. Id. at 2262-63.
Brown might suggest that the Court is less inclined to narrow the exclusionary rule
in fourth amendment cases than in fifth amendment cases. Such an inference seems
inappropriate, however. See United States v. Peltier, 95 S. Ct. 2313 (1975); United States
v. Calandra, supra. In Peltier, decided the day before Brown, the Court held that
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), which ruled unconstitutional cer-
tain roving border searches conducted without a warrant or probable cause, was in-
applicable to searches conducted prior to the Almeida-Sanchez decision. The Peltier
Court asserted that the type of search involved in Almeida-Sanchez and Peltier was widely
regarded as constitutional prior to Almeida-Sanchez, and stated:
If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct, then
evidence obtained from a search should be suppressed only if it can be said that
[Vol. 3
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totally replaced so long as it remains a constitutional mandate, 22 it
could be supplemented. Various alternatives have been suggested, 2
the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with
knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
95 S. Ct. at 2320. Justice Brennan, in a vigorous dissent, asserted that the above state-
ment foreshadowed the emasculation of the exclusionary rule in fourth amendment
cases. Id. at 2324 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Peltier Court, Justice Brennan stated, had
turned from the view "that suppression is necessarily the sanction to be applied when
it is determined that the evidence was in fact illegally acquired" to a standard that
would require inquiry as to "the subjective knowledge of the official who orders the
search, and the inferences from existing law that official should have drawn." Id. at
2325-26 (footnotes omitted). Justice Brennan concluded:
If a majority of my colleagues are determined to discard the exclusionary
rule in Fourth Amendment cases, they should forthrightly do so, and be done
with it. This business of slow strangulation of the rule, with no opportunity
afforded parties most concerned to be heard, would be indefensible in any cir-
cumstances. But to attempt covertly the erosion of an important principle over
61 years in the making as applied in federal courts clearly demeans the ad-
judicatory function, and the institutional integrity of this court.
Id. at 2330.
22. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); note 12 supra.
23. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388 (1971), suggested legislation could provide a meaningful substitute for the
exclusionary rule. Such legislation, he felt, should include:
(a) a waiver of sovereign immunity as to the illegal acts of law enforcement
officials committed in the performance of assigned duties;
(b) the creation of a cause of action for damages sustained by any person
aggrieved by conduct of governmental agents in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment or statutes regulating official conduct;
(c) the creation of a tribunal, quasi-judicial in nature . . . to adjudicate all
claims under the statute;
(d) a provision that this statutory remedy is in lieu of the exclusion of
evidence secured for use in criminal cases in violation of the Fourth Amendment;
and
(e) a provision directing that no evidence, otherwise admissible, shall be
excluded from any criminal proceeding because of violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
Id. at 422-23. This approach has a number of shortcomings. The damage is assessed
not against the offending officer but his employer. Although the plaintiff may bring
an action for damages, there is no provision to compensate the plaintiff for his costs
in bringing suit, thereby excluding a significant number of potential plaintiffs. In
addition, the remedy proposed is only applicable to federal officers. Burger assumes
that the states would follow the federal model, a view that may not be justified. See
generally Note, Exclusionary Rule Under Attack, 4 U. BALT. L. REv. 89 (1974); Comment,
The Exclusionary Rule in Context, 50 N.C.L. REV. 1049 (1972).
Another proposed alternative would grant the courts greater latitude in determining
whether the application of the exclusionary rule is justified. Rather than apply the
exclusionary rule whenever there has been a violation of fourth amendment rights,
the courts would take into consideration all surrounding circumstances, including the
following:
(a) the importance of the particular interest violated;
(b) the extent of deviation from lawful conduct;
(c) the extent to which the violation was willful;
(d) the extent to which privacy was invaded;
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but at present the exclusionary rule continues to be applied as the
primary remedy for fourth amendment violations. Although some
civil remedies do exist for violations of constitutional guarantees,
they have not been fully utilized and contain serious defects which
make them, at present, inadequate safeguards of fourth amendment
rights.2 4 However, in light of the extreme effect of the exclusionary
rule, it is likely that the courts will continue to search for a viable
alternative.
Although the fourth amendment speaks specifically of searches
and seizures, it has been interpreted to encompass a right to be free
from arbitrary police entries of an individual's home.2 5 The warrant
requirement interposed between the police and the public reflects the
belief that the decision to enter or search should not rest with the
(e) the extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent violations of this Code;
(f) whether, but for the violation, the things seized would have been dis-
covered; and
(g) the extent to which the violation prejudiced the moving party's ability
to support his motion, or to defend himself in the proceeding in which the things
seized are sought to be offered in evidence against him.
A.L.I. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURtE § 290.2(2) (Official Draft No. 1, 1972).
24. Generally, an officer is liable under state law for torts arising from his law
enforcement activities. The common law actions include false imprisonment, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, trespass, and assault and battery. See Foote, Tort Remedies
for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493 (1955); Rubinstein,
Liability in Tort of Judicial Officers, 15 U. TORONTO L.J. 317 (1964). These actions,
however, have usually proved inadequate because of the immeasurable injury often
suffered, the deterring cost of the suit, and a general reluctance of juries to award
damages against a police officer to a plaintiff who is often accused or convicted of some
offense.
In addition to state common law tort remedies, a victim of an illegal search or entry
may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Although § 1983 is a potentially useful device for relief, it is not applicable to federal
action. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), however,
the Court upheld a private claim for money damages against a federal agent. The Court
did not define the scope of such an action. See generally Comment, Use of § 1983 to
Remedy Unconstitutional Police Conduct: Guarding the Guards, 5 HARv. Civ. RIGHTS-
Civ. LIB. L. REV. 104 (1970); Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitu-
tional Police Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1968).
25. See, e.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Chapman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961). Cf. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886): "It is
not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the
essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty and private property . ... "
For the text of the fourth amendment, see note 8 supra.
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police officer but with a neutral magistrate.26 However, exceptions
to the warrant requirement have been recognized.27
In the instant case, there was no warrant for the arrest of the de-
fendant or for the search of his room. Initially, the officers were law-
fully admitted to the defendant's room, ostensibly to purchase drugs.
Although they gained admittance by ruse, this in itself does not violate
the fourth amendment guarantees that the announcement statute
seeks to protect. 28 Entry gained by deception without announcement of
an officer's true identity and purpose is constitutionally permissible
as long as force is not used.29 As there was no violation of the de-
fendant's constitutional rights by the officers' entry at the defendant's
express invitation, the officers were not initially bound by the knock
and announce statute even though the defendant misapprehended
the officers' true identity and purpose.2 0 Had the officers arrested the
defendant during the negotiations for the sale of the marijuana, the
arrest would have been legal; the defendant was in the process of
committing a felony in the officers' presence.3 1 One of the officers left
26. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10 (1948); Note, The Neglected Fourth Amendment Problem in Arrest Entries, 23
STAN. L. REv. 995 (1971).
27. FLA. STAT. § 901.15 (1973) sets forth the situations in which a peace officer may
arrest without a warrant. Subsection (1) permits an officer to make a warrantless arrest
for a felony when the arrestee has committed a felony in the officer's presence. See also
Koptyra v. State, 172 So. 2d 628, 630 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
Warrantless searches are regarded as reasonable where, for instance, the search is
incident to a lawful arrest, FLA. STAT. § 901.21(l) (1973); see United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Casso v. State, 182 So. 2d
252 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966); the evidence is in plain view, see, e.g., Boim v. State,
194 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967); see also note 49 infra; consent to search
is given, see note 49 infra; exigent circumstances exist, see, e.g., Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757 (1966); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); see also note 3 supra.
28. United States v. Glassel, 488 F.2d 143, 145 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
941 (1974) (officer may legitimately obtain an invitation to enter a house by mis-
representing his identity, and if invited to enter need not announce his authority and
purpose; once inside, the officer may seize anything in plain view but may not exceed
the scope of his invitation by ransacking the house generally). See generally United States
v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); Smith v.
United States, 357 F.2d 486, 488 n.1 (5th Cir. 1966) (no violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3109
(1970) where entry by deception is peaceful, because no breaking occurs); Powers v.
State, 271 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Koptyra v. State, 172 So. 2d 628 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Annot., 21 A.L.R. FED. 820, 877-81 (1974).
29. Smith v. United States, 357 F.2d 486, 488 n.1 (5th Cir. 1966), and cases cited
therein; Koptyra v. State, 172 So. 2d 628, 631-32 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965). See
note 28 supra.
30. Cf. State v. Roman, 309 So. 2d 12, 13 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
31. See id. at 13; note 27 supra. A defendant arrested in these circumstances might
raise an entrapment defense. Florida courts, however, are reluctant to recognize the
defense of entrapment when dealing with the sale of drugs, especially if the defendant
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the room, however, and it was only upon his reentry without an-
nouncement that the defendant was arrested and the evidence seized. 2
The court's basis for applying the exclusionary rule was the failure
of the arresting officer to comply with the knock and announce statute.
Had the officer remaining behind made the arrest, the court would
likely have reached a different conclusion, as he was lawfully present
in the defendant's room.3 3
Generally, when authorized to make an arrest for a felony without
a warrant, and entry into a dwelling is necessary, an officer is bound
by the requirements of Florida's knock and announce statute.3 4 Ex-
ceptions to this rule have been acknowledged by the courts.35 Al-
though in the instant case the state contended that the officer's reentry
fell within these exceptions, the trial court rejected these claims and
makes the initial offer. Blackshear v. State, 246 So. 2d 173, 174 (Fla. 1st. Dist. Ct. App. 1971),
states the general rule:
[The officers] were acting in good faith for the purpose of detecting a crime
and merely furnished the opportunity for its commission by [the defendant] who
already had the requisite criminal intent to violate the law. [The officers] were
not used as decoys to ensnare the innocent and law-abiding [defendant] . . .
but merely presented to him the opportunity of doing what he was already willing
to do.
See also United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356
U.S. 369 (1958) (entrapment established as a matter of law); Sorrells v. United States,
287 U.S. 435 (1932) (defense of entrapment recognized).
32. 309 So. 2d at 14.
33. Cf. id. at 13.
34. Under FLA. STAT. § 901.15 (1973), the officers were authorized to make an arrest
without a warrant. See note 27 supra. For the text of the Florida knock and announce
statute, see note 2 supra.
35. Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1964), is the leading case construing
FLA. STAT. § 901.19(1) (1973). The Benefield court recognized several exceptions to the
rules of announcement:
(1) where the person within already knows of the officer's authority and purpose;
(2) where the officers are justified in the belief that the persons within are in
imminent peril of bodily harm; (3) if the officer's peril would have been in-
creased had he demanded entrance and stated the purpose, or (4) where those
within made aware of the presence of someone outside are then engaged in activi-
ties which justify the officers in the belief that an escape or destruction of the
evidence is being attempted.
160 So. 2d at 710. The fourth exception recognized by the Benefield court has been
extended to permit unannounced entries when it is reasonable for the officers to
assume that attempts to escape or destroy evidence would be made if the officers
announced their identity and purpose to those inside. State v. Clarke, 242 So. 2d 791,
795 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971). Florida courts have long recognized that small
amounts of drugs are easily disposable, and thus may be difficult to obtain as evidence.
See Earman v. State, 265 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1972); Benefield v. State, supra; State v. Clarke,
supra. See also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); United States v. Blake, 484 F.2d
50 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 949 (1974); Gaines v. Craven, 448 F.2d 1236 (9th
Cir. 1971).
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held the entry illegal.36 Since the trial court's conclusions in Florida
have traditionally been "clothed with a presumption of correctness,"
the court of appeal refused to disturb the lower court's factual findings
in the absence of substantial contrary evidence. 7
In the instant case the issue was raised whether the reentry of the
officer had been implicitly consented to by the defendant. Relying on
State v. Collier, 3 the court held that the initial invitation to enter the
room did not extend to subsequent entries.3 A factual situation similar
to Roman had come before the court the year before in State v.
Yenke. 40 In Yenke, two undercover agents were admitted to the de-
fendant's home to purchase marijuana. While one agent was weighing
the bags, the other officer left the house, supposedly to get the pur-
chase money. He returned a few minutes later with several other agents
and arrested the defendant. The agent's reentry did not comply with the
announcement requirements of the Florida statute. However, the
court held that the agent "had ostensibly gone to get the money with
which to pay [the defendant]. He was impliedly invited to return .... -41
36. The state contended that the officer had knocked prior to entry. The trial
court rejected this claim in light of the evidence. 309 So. 2d at 14. It is questionable
whether the officer's mere knock, absent any showing of defendant's consent to the
entry, would have satisfied § 901.19(1). The statute requires announcement of identity
and purpose. See State v. Collier, 270 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972), cited
as authority by the court in the instant case for its application of the exclusionary rule.
See also Rodriguez v. State, 189 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966); note 2 supra.
Other claims raised by the state were similarly disposed of by the court in its
examination of the evidence. The evidence indicated that one of the officers remaining
in the room was armed. There was no indication that the defendant or his roommates
(who were also present) were armed, thereby precluding the state's argument that the
arresting officer's noncompliance with the statute was justified by fear for the safety
of the officers remaining behind. In addition, the court noted the room had no drains
or unblocked exits, thus foreclosing an argument that possible destruction of the
evidence justified noncompliance with the statute. 309 So. 2d at 14.
37. 309 So. 2d at 15. See Cameron v. State, 112 So. 2d 864, 869 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1959), cited as authority by the court in the instant case. Cf. United States v. Phelps, 490
F.2d 644 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974); State v. Bell, 249 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Rodriguez v. State, 189 So. 2d 656 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
38. 270 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972). Collier involved the execution of
a search warrant. The arresting officer, having previously arranged with the defendant
to purchase drugs, joined the defendant and some friends at the defendant's apart-
ment. The officer testified that the group appeared to be having a pot party. He
then left the apartment, returning a few minutes later to arrest the defendant. The
court excluded the evidence seized for noncompliance with FLA. STAT. § 933.09 (1973) (the
announcement test is essentially the same for entries for the purpose of effecting an
arrest, FLA. STAT. § 901.19 (1973), and entries for the purpose of executing a search
warrant, FLA. STAT. § 933.09 (1973)).
39. 309 So. 2d at 15.
40. 288 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
41. Id. at 532. The officer in Yenke had a search warrant. The court held, however,
that the officer was not involved in executing the search warrant when he returned to
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The returning officer's noncompliance with the statute did not, in the
court's opinion, compel the exclusion of the evidence. This holding
was based on the defendant's implied consent to the reentry and the
fact that the evidence was not discovered as a result of an ensuing
search.4 2 Rather the evidence seized was in plain view and, according
to the Yenke court, was delivered to the officer remaining behind as
part of the proposed sale.
4 3
Collier presented a somewhat different factual situation. 44 In Col-
lier, there was no suggestion in the evidence that the defendant ex-
pected the officer to return. In the instant case and in Yenke, the ar-
resting officer was expected to return with the money. There was no
surprise in his reentry other than the change in role from potential
buyer to policeman and the manner of reentry. In addition, in Yenke
and the instant case, but not in Collier, a police officer remained in
the house.
The issue of implied consent to reentry has been considered by
federal courts, primarily in conjunction with the continued presence
of another officer on the premises.45 The implied consent theory may
be justified on the basis of the purpose underlying the announcement
statutes. Fourth amendment guarantees protect only against unreason-
able searches or intrusions. The announcement requirements there-
fore seek to reduce the trauma accompanying a police intrusion to a
reasonable level; the statutes cannot totally eliminate such trauma.
When an officer lawfully enters the premises of an individual, de-
parts those premises leaving another agent behind, and subsequently
reenters to effectuate an arrest or search the premises, the reentry
may not constitute an "intrusion" so unreasonable as to warrant ap-
plication of the announcement requirements.
The lawful presence of a government agent precludes any argument
that later entries violate the privacy of occupants. Since privacy
is what [the knock and announce statute] seeks to protect, the
prior lawful entry and continued presence of [the other agent]
vitiates any impropriety of subsequent entries.46
the house. Had the entry been solely for the purpose of executing the search warrant,
the officer would have been held to the announcement requirements. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. For the facts of Collier, see note 38 supra.
45. See United States v. Hutchinson, 488 F.2d 484 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 915 (1974); United States v. Glassel, 488 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Bradley, 455 F.2d 1181 (1st Cir. 1972), ajf'd on other grounds, 410 U.S. 605 (1973).
46. United States v. Bradley, 455 F.2d 1181, 1186 (1st Cir. 1972). In Bradley, the
initial entry of the officers had been obtained by ruse. See note 28 supra.
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The Roman court, however, appeared to be concerned with the
manner in which the reentry was made-the officers entered the room
with guns drawn and were apparently followed by reporters.47 This
concern may have prompted the court's attempt to distinguish Yenke.
In Yenke, the officer remaining behind was weighing the marijuana.
As the drugs were in his actual possession, they were, in the Roman
court's opinion, seized prior to the improper entry of the returning
officer.4 8 In the instant case, the "lid" of marijuana was placed on a
table when the officer left the room. The evidence was not actually
seized until Officer Beckstrom returned. In the Roman court's opinion,
the evidence was seized as a direct result of the improper entry of
Beckstrom.49 On the basis of this distinction, the Roman court held
47. 309 So. 2d at 13. There are frequent references in Roman to the manner in
which the reentry was accomplished.
48. Id. at 15. The Yenke opinion is not as clear as the Roman court indicated. The
Yenke court referred both to the delivery of the evidence to the officer remaining behind
and to the implied invitation to return extended to the arresting officer. See note 41 and
accompanying text supra.
49. 309 So. 2d at 15. In Roman, some evidence seized was in plain view, some was
found in a search of a dresser and table, and some evidence was located when the
defendant revealed its location in response to police questions and promises of leniency.
Since the court concluded all the evidence was seized as the result of an unlawful
entry, it did not reach defendant's contention that the evidence not in plain view was
improperly seized regardless of the legality of the entry. 309 So. 2d at 15 n.4.
A reasonable search incident to a lawful arrest is permissible. Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969), limits a search incident to a lawful arrest to "a search of
the arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control-construing that phrase
to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible
evidence." See FLA. STAT. § 901.21(2) (1973). There is little dispute as to the authority
of the arresting officer to search the person of the arrestee. See United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. Califosnia, supra; Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145
(1947). Problems arise, however, as to the extent of the area of search within the
arrestee's control. The courts have dealt with this issue on a case-by-case basis, generally
following the guidelines of Chimel. See generally United States v. Robinson, supra;
Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964)
(automobile). In light of the fact that the instant defendant was handcuffed im-
mediately after his arrest, the area "within his immediate control" was greatly restricted.
The search of the desk and drawer could be considered outside the accepted perimeter of
a search incident to a lawful arrest under Chimel.
Consent to search or a confession must be freely and voluntarily given. Voluntary
consent to search, however, does not mean the defendant must know he has a right
to withhold consent. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). Consent to
search or a confession given under promises of leniency by the arresting officer are
generally considered involuntary and therefore invalid. State v. Chorpenning, 294 So. 2d
54 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974), and cases cited therein. In addition to the promises of
leniency made in the instant case, the arrest and subsequent search were made at gun-
point, a further indication that the defendant's consent to the search was not freely
given. See Earman v. State, 265 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1972) (consent to search given at gun-
point after illegal entry did not ameliorate illegal entry); Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 858 (1966).
Where the evidence is in plain view and no search is necessary, the guarantees
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Yenke inapplicable to the instant case. 50
Constructive possession by the remaining officer could have been
used to justify seizure of this evidence.5 1 Provided there was no
violation of constitutional rights by his initial entry, the continued
presence of an officer has been considered by some courts to give the
officer constructive possession of the evidence. Under this theory, the
illegal entry of other officers does not make the evidence inadmissible.
Since the evidence is in the possession of an agent at the time of the
.subsequent entry, and is not obtained as a result of that entry, the
legality of the later entry does not affect the admissibility of the
evidence. Although the remaining officer's possession is not actual, it
is his duty to guard the evidence and, if necessary, take actual posses-
sion. This duty has been considered sufficient to constitute construc-
tive possession of the evidence, enabling the courts to bypass the
legality of other officers' entry.5 2 The court's holding in State v.
Yenke53 seemed to indicate a move toward acceptance of these views.
However, its reliance on Collier in the instant case suggests the court
is unwilling to accept the concepts of implied consent and constructive
possession as justifications for noncompliance with announcement
standards.
While the fourth amendment prohibits harassment or prejudicial
enforcement of the law, it does not forbid the "application of common
sense in the detection of crime and the apprehension of criminals. ' ' 54
Courts should reconcile the personal liberties of the individual and
the performance of law enforcement in light of the facts in a particular
case.
The question is whether protection for the individual would not
be gained at a disproportionate loss of protection for society. On
the one side is the social need that crime shall be repressed.
On the other, the social need that law shall not be flouted by
the insolence of office. There are dangers in any choice.' 5
against unlawful searches and seizures are not applicable. "It is not a search to
observe, and to seize, what is so placed where it may be seen by an officer who is
where he has a legal right to be." State v. Ashby, 245 So. 2d 225, 227 (Fla. 1971); accord,
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
50. 309 So. 2d at 15.
51. Constructive possession has been defined as "knowingly having both the power
and intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over the property."
United States v. Hutchinson, 488 F.2d 484, 488 (8th Cir. 1973), and cases cited therein.
52. See United States v. Glassel, 488 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1973) (theory of constructive
possession applied in admitting evidence).
53. 288 So. 2d at 532.
54. State v. Holmes, 256 So. 2d 32, 37 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (footnote
omitted).
55. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 589 (N.Y.) (Cardozo, J.), cert. denied, 270 U.S.
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The Roman court determined that the protection of individual rights
requires strict compliance with the announcement rule. But requiring
literal compliance with the knock and announce statute in the face
of substantial evidence of the defendant's guilt may justify the fear
expressed by some that the major effect of the exclusionary rule is
to let the guilty go unpunished. The exclusionary rule has never been
interpreted to extend to all proceedings or persons who have been
victims of illegal entries or searches, nor should it be.56 The announce-
ment requirements developed as a means of effectuating fourth amend-
ment rights. In turn, the exclusionary rule was applied to ensure that
law enforcement officers would comply with the announcement require-
ments. Thus the mandate of the exclusionary rule is twice removed
from the constitutional guarantees it seeks to protect. The rule might
be worth its cost, i.e. letting the guilty go free, if, as its proponents
argue, it is the "only effective deterrent to police misconduct." 51 How-
ever, in light of increasing evidence that it does not fulfill this pur-
pose, serious doubts arise as to its application. 5 Application of the
rule should be limited to situations where it most efficaciously serves
to protect individual privacy, preserve property, or prevent violence.
When these purposes are not served by application of the exclusionary
rule, other remedies for violations of constitutional rights should be
sought. 59
JOSLYN WILSON
Insurance - "OTHER INSURANCE" PROVISIONS - CONFLICTING ESCAPE
CLAUSES IN CONCURRENT AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY POLICIES ARE VOID.-
World Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Stauffer, 306 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1974).
Defendant Clarence Maurer was involved in an automobile accident
while driving a rental car owned by codefendant World Rent-A-Car,
Inc. He was covered by an omnibus clause in the rental agency's policy
657 (1926). See also Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 38-41 (1963); id. at 54-60 (Brennan,
J., concurring in part); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 272 (1960) ("[A] claim
under 18 U.S.C. § 3109 depends upon the particular circumstances surrounding the
[entry]."); State v. Hetzko, 283 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
56. See cases cited note 11 supra.
57. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968).
58. See note 13 supra.
59. For discussion of alternative remedies see notes 23, 24 supra. The Roman court
may have been influenced by (1) the widespread opinion that possession of marijuana
is not (or should not be) a serious offense, (2) the traditional isolation of a college
campus from the surrounding community, and (3) the extravagant manner in which
the arrest was accomplished.
